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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS W. TOLMAN and VERLA F. 
TOLMAN, 
Appellants 
Appellate Case No. 20060713-CA 
LOGAN CITY and JOHN and JANE 
DOES, 1-20, 
Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in granting a summary judgment, dismissing the 
complaint filed by Appellants ("Tolmans")? 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine 
issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we do not defer to the legal conclusions of the district court, but review 
them for correctness. When reviewing a municipality's land use decision, 
our review is limited to determining "whether . . . the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." 
Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City ofSpringville, 1999 UT 25, ^ [22, 979 
P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). This issue was preserved in the trial court in Tolmans' 
memorandum opposing motion for summary judgment. R. 199-216. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, 
Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Utah: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
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Section 10-9a-801(3), Utah Code: 
(a) The Courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercfse of legislative 
discretion is valid if the decision, ordinance, or regulation is reasonably 
debatable and not illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if 
the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the 
time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
Section 10-9a-405, Utah Code 
Except as provided in Section 10-9a-406, the general plan is an advisory 
guide for land use decisions, the impact of which shall be determined by 
ordinance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Tolmans' suit is a challenge to Logan City's denial of a rezone request that 
Tolmans allege would allow use of their property consistent with surrounding 
properties. It is an action for review of a Logan City Council land use decision 
denying their application to rezone their single family home-lot, and 31 others the 
City advised and directed them to include, from a single-family zone up to a multi-
family zone. When they purchased their home it was then and has ever since been 
surrounded by multi-family homes. This multi-family zone was established by a 
master plan, zoning ordinance and map adopted in 1950. By an unconstitutional 
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amendment that violated the plan, the area was down-zoned to single family in 
1989 by an unconstitutional ordinance; it was then confirmed by a defective 
revised plan in 1995, implemented by an expanded defective amended ordinance 
in 1996. Similar conditions exist in the other lots included in the rezone. This 
University neighborhood has been in predominantly multi-family uses since and 
before zoning. Under the U.S. Supreme Court doctrine of "reverse spot zoning" 
the denial of the rezone was arbitrary, capricious, illegal and denied substantive 
due process and equal protection. Tolman's also make claims for damages for 
regulatory takings, and against unnamed officials who may have acted in objective 
bad faith in the enactment or enforcement of the unconstitutional amendments. R. 
20-26. Based on the record developed in the summary judgment proceedings 
Tolmans claim that all the down-zoning amendment "schemes" of 1989, 1995 and 
1996 are unconstitutional, and void as a matter of law. 
The City moved for summary judgment against Tolmans on their second 
amended complaint. R. 146-148. The City supported the motion with a 
memorandum (R. 33-49) and exhibits A-K consisting entirely of City public 
records. R. 50-145. Absent from the extensive records supplied by the City, is the 
original 1950 zoning plan-ordinance which Tolmans included as their Exhibit w;C." 
Tolmans filed a memorandum opposing the City's motion for summary 
judgment R. 199-216. The affidavit of Tolman is attached. R. 158-66. The 
affidavit verified the Second Amended Complaint (R. 158 Tf 1) and incorporated; 
Ex. "A", the signatures of owners of other lots and supporters of the expanded 
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rezone application (R-167-63, R. 159-60, f 3-5); Ex. "B' \ maps (R. 174-79); and, 
Ex. "C", the original comprehensive plan-zoning ordinance of 1950 dedicating this 
area for multi-family dwellings. R. 180-97. 
The City filed a reply memorandum with no attachments, affidavits or 
exhibits. R. 218-25. 
The District Court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it granted the 
City's motion "[f]or reasons stated by the Defendant in it's original Memorandum, 
and more specifically, in it's Reply Memorandum." R. 229-30. The Court then 
entered a Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal, incorporating the reasons 
given in the City's memorandums without any other rationale. R. 233-34. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tolmans purchased their older single-family home in 1983. It was located 
in a zone which had been multi-family from the beginning of zoning in 1950. That 
1950 zoning ordinance was also the comprehensive plan. R. 21, [^5. Tolmans 
raised their nine children in the home until they purchased and moved into another 
home in 2002. They attempted without success to sell their home for a reasonable 
price because the City in 1989 had granted a zoning amendment down-zoning the 
area to a single family zone. R, 22 f 9. Tolmans' home was completely surrounded 
by multi-family dwellings. In 1995 the City incorporated the 1989 downzoning 
into an amended comprehensive plan and its 1996 ordinance and map based on the 
pretext that it would restore single-family character, where there had never been 
single family character. R.38. In the broader neighborhood multi-family uses 
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overwhelmingly predominated. In the four-block area in which their lot centered, 
63%, or 89 of the 142 residential structures were multi-family. In the expanded-
rezone requested area, 74% or 23 of the 31 dwellings are multi-family. During the 
resulting three months delay caused by the City's insistence on expanding to a 
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multi-lot rezone, Tolman was able to get the owners of all 31 adjacent lots to join 
in the petition. Of the 8 single family lots in the rezone area, 3 including Tolmans' 
are totally surrounded by multi-family, 3 adjacent single-family lots owned by one 
owner are totally surrounded and the other 2 adjacent single-family lots are also 
totally surrounded by multi-family uses. The multi-family dwellings in the rezone 
area are severely limited by their non-conforming use status. R. 162-65 & 175-79. 
Not only does the City fail to deny that Tolmans' home is totally 
surrounded by multi-family structures in this neighborhood aind rezone area where 
multi-family uses overwhelmingly predominate, the Planning Department, 
Planning Commission and City Council, affirmatively admit that multi-family uses 
are the "best uses" and therefore predominate in this area as follows: (emphasis 
supplied) 
18. The City's Planning staff prepared an evaluation of the Tolman 
application on July 14, 2004. The staff recognized that multi-family use is 
likely the best use in the area and that preliminary results of the general 
plan revision process would probably support the rezoning. (Staff Report, 
July 14, 2004, copy enclosed as Exhibit H.)" R.38 Cily Statement of Facts. 
The area of the proposed rezone is dominated by existing multi-family 
dwellings and is surrounded by a mixture of single family homes and 
multifamily properties". R. 107, Staff Report. 
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Community Development Director Jay L. Nielson reviewed a rezone 
request that had been denied by the Planning Commission to rezone 32 
properties from single family to Multi-Family High. He explained that 600 
East was the current dividing line for high density. The request was made 
because more than 60% [74% actual supra] of the properties in the area 
were currently multi-family, and the likelihood of the area being restored to 
single family [pretext for downzoning] was in Mr. Nielson's words 
"extremely remote99 [virtually impossible without demolition of 39 years of 
multi-family development]. Mr. Nielson said the consensus [whose?] of the 
"Plan for Growth Challenge" was that the fringes [arbitrary piece-mealing] 
of 400 North should be higher than it currently is, but final conclusions 
have not had any type of public scrutiny yet [mandate for judicial rezone]. 
R. 139, Council pre-hearing. 
18. The staff recognized that multi-family use is likely the best use in the 
area and that the preliminary results of the general plan revision process 
[political] process [still not started] would probably support the 
rezoning.. .[after Tolmans' bankruptcy or death if ever]. 
19. The staff believed the rezoning request was premature, implying that it 
might be better under the revised general plan . " [reason why judicial v. 
political rezone imperative]. 
20. The staff also recognized the requirement that the rezoning be 
consistent with the [revised] general and that the rezoning might constitute 
illegal spot zoning [in law denial of rezone is illegal "reverse spot zoning"]. 
21. The staff recommended denial of the request because it was 
incompatible with the [revised] General Plan objective 'to restore the 
single family scale, character•, and stability to the area [repeats the same 
erroneous pretext for plan-contra downzoning]." R.38, City Facts. 
The City's justification for the down-zoning of 1989 and; downzoning's 
confirmation in the current amended 1995 Plan revision; and the second amended 
and expanded 1996 zoning ordinance; has been always and repeatedly based on 
the disingenuous premise: That it would "restore the single family scale, 
character, and stability of the area" (supra), and that these "were basically 
established single family neighborhoods": (emphasis supplied) 
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The actions sought, called downzoning requests, were intended to stop 
proliferation of fourplex residential development in what were basically 
established single family neighborhoods." R. 36, \ 12, 
The falsehood involved in the City's pretense that these were ever 
"basically established single family neighborhoods " is further illustrated by the 
location of Tolmans' home on 400 North Street, which bisects the neighborhood. 
Fourth North, which is U.S. Highway 89, is and always has been a major 
thoroughfare ever since Utah State Agricultural College ("USU") was established 
in the late 1800's. It is the direct opposite of a typical quiet single family 
neighborhood for families with children. From Tolman's affidavit: 
7 . . . Our home and lot at [5]25 East Fourth North, fronts on a four 
lane highway and principal traffic artery designated on the Plats as 'Fourth 
North Street' [R. 175-179]. It has turning lanes with parallel parking on 
both sides and a speed limit of 40 miles per hour. It is one of the principal 
traffic arteries in the valley and points east. It [is] also US Highway 89, and 
designated by Logan City as "University Boulevard". It is also the main 
arterial highway connecting downtown Logan, five blocks to the west of 
our home, to Utah State University, less than two blocks East of our home. 
It has always been the main entry to and through the University campus. 
The eastern extension of US 89 beyond campus is the highway through 
Logan Canyon and continues on to Yellowstone Park. It connects with 
other highways going to points easterly from Cache Valley. The block East 
of our Block 14 borders on the west of the Campus and has always been 
zoned for multiple dwelling housing. The four blocks included in Exhibit B 
[R. 175-179] has always been the prime location for University student, 
staff, and personnel housing in predominantly multi-dwelling housing as 
described in Exhibit B and City Exhibit H. 
8 . . . I was raised in my family home at 393 East 4th North Street 
until 1970. For 13 years thereafter I was in the Military, school and work, 
living away from Logan but frequently visiting my family and friends who 
lived in this neighborhood. My ancestors have lived in this neighborhood 
since about 1916.1 moved back into the neighborhood in a rented home for 
one year and purchased the subject home in 1983 where we lived and raised 
our nine children... .1 thus have intimate knowledge of this neighborhood." 
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R. 161-62. 
Tolmans have never taken any action in reliance on or in support of the 
down-zoning ordinance of 1989 or the confirming 1996 ordinance: 
2. Neither me nor my wife have ever taken any actioij in reliance on 
the Logan City rezoning ordinances of 1989 or 1996, which down-zoned 
the property on which our subject home is located, from multi-family to a 
single family dwelling zone. When we purchased the home in 1983 we 
relied on the Zoning Ordinance 1950 then in effect, which established the 
multi-family zoning and the predominant multi-family uses in that zone that 
assured us that we would be able to sell the home for a reasonable price 
surrounded by multiple dwellings. 
R. 159. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The summary judgment dismissing the complaint [R. 233-34] contradicts 
the law applied to the uncontradicted facts established in Tolman's affidavit and 
exhibits (R. 158-198, 20-26 verified complaint) which the City failed to put at 
issue with either affidavits or counter affidavits in their summary judgment 
pleadings. The City's records also strongly support Tolman's affidavit. 
In this case, Tolman's unchallenged affidavit and the City's records 
establish the facts leading to the conclusion that the whole three-stage downzoning 
'"Scheme" is unconstitutional. This renders the 1989, 1995 and 1996 amendments 
to the 1950 plan-ordinance null and void. For brevity this Scheme is hereafter 
referred to as the "D-Z Scheme"or "Scheme." 
Alternatively, as "reverse spot zoning" is applied to Tolmans, and the other 
petitioners, by denying Tolmans' rezone of their single family dwelling and lot 
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from a single family zone to a multi family zone where it is surrounded by multi 
family uses, the City has denied equal protection and substantive due process in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Supreme Court, 
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) distinguished 
legitimate zoning from the type of "reverse spot" zoning involved in this case, 
which denies equal protection and due process: 
[Ljandmark laws are not like discriminatory or 'reverse spot' zoning ; that 
is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for 
different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones 
M a t 132. 
Based on the same reasons and Tolman's unchallenged affidavit facts, the 
"takings" claims have been established, or at least adequately alleged. 
This rezone denial was a non-debatable determination by the City Council, 
acting as a land-use authority with no discretion to do other than rezone the 
"island" lots to allow their uses consistent with the predominating surrounding 
uses. 
There was ample evidence in the record that the City's refusal to rezone 
Tolmans' property amounted to a confiscatory, discriminatory, arbitrary, 
capricious, and illegal reverse spot zone. There is ample evidence in the record 
that the 1989 amendments and general downzones that followed were 
unconstitutional in all of the same respects. This case should be allowed to go to 
trial so that Tolmans and other islanders within the multi-family sea in the shadow 
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of Old Main Hill may use their property as the 1950 master plan and ordinance 
allowed and as the neighborhood has existed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TOLMANS ARE VICTIMS OF REVERSE SPOT ZONING 
In Penn Central 438 U.S. at 142 infra, the Supreme Court adopts the 
illegal "reverse spot" zoning doctrine applicable here. It also provides a threshold 
question of the use in cases of various synonyms for denials of equal protection 
and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and "takings" under 
the Fifth Amendment. The meaning of terms is a key to understanding the 
application of a variety of different terms used in cases and authorities that signify 
the same constitutional violations. Penn Central is an example where 
"discriminatory" equates to an equal protection denial and "arbitrary" refers to a 
substantive due process denial. 
Many synonyms are employed in cases, statutes etc. that equate to denial of 
[substantive] "due process", equal protection; and to "takings", all at issue here. 
Substantive due process denial equates to actions that are "arbitrary," "capacious," 
"irrational," "unreasonable," and "fail to advance the legitimate government 
interest." Unconstitutional takings are called "confiscatory," "serious injury or 
loss," and "not economically viable." Denials of equal protection equate to; 
"invidious," "class," and "irrational" "'discrimination. " See 83 Am Jur 2d 
Zoning and Planning, §§ 35-39. 
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The Penn Central "reverse spot" zoning holding affirmed a decision of the 
Court of Appeals of New York in Penn Central Transp. Co.. v. City New York 
City. 366 N.E.2d 1271, 42 N.Y.2d 324, (1977; which provides a more detailed 
rational for the doctrine: 
To this extent, such [landmark] restrictions resemble "discriminatory" 
zoning restrictions, properly condemned, affecting properties singled out in 
a zoning district for more restrictive or more liberal zoning limitations (see 
Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 476-478). There is howrever a significant 
difference. Discriminatory zoning is condemned because there is no 
acceptable reason for singling out one particular parcel for different and 
less favorable treatment. 
Id, at 1274-75 
In Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 476-477 (1968) the court 
held that there was discriminatory "reverse spot" zoning in the same context as 
here, where the surrounding less restrictive uses resulted from non-conforming 
uses commenced before down-zoning. This case relates to the whole D-Z Scheme 
as well as the single and multiple lot rezone levels. 
Discrimination in zoning is usually thought of in terms of the 
injustice done to the landowner. In reality it is also a wrong done to the 
community's land use control scheme. It is the opposite side of the coin, 
one side of which is "spot zoning." Nevertheless, a claim of discrimination 
is not just another way of saying that the change does not accord with the 
comprehensive plan. When the claim is one of discrimination, the focus of 
inquiry is narrower. The issue is the propriety of the treatment of the 
subject parcel as compared to neighboring properties. 
. . . The court pointed out that, while those properties would of 
course be entitled to an exemption for existing nonconforming uses, there 
was nothing to differentiate that parcel from [a neighboring parcel] 
... .A property owner need not prove confiscation to establish 
discrimination. In almost every respect the properties are alike. 
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Id, at 476-78. 
Three reported Utah cases have accepted, defined and distinguished the 
applicable principle of illegal "reverse spot zoning." Using "island" terminology, 
these cases hold that spot zoning results in two types of "islands." They recognize 
that the type in this case is illegal and results when the zoning authority limits the 
uses which can be made of a small parcel located in the center of a less restricted 
use area. The other type of spot zoned island is legal and results when most of a 
large district is devoted to a restricted use, but additional less restrictive uses are 
permitted in one or more spots in the district. Examples of legal spot zoning are 
residential area grocery-convenience stores etc. None of the four Utah decisions 
found illegal spot zoning in the facts because either the area was too large to be 
considered an "island," or it was next to a different zone, or because the "island" 
in question enjoyed fewer restrictions than those on the surrounding properties. 
See Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 149 A.L.'R. 282, 
(1943). Crestview-Holliday Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 
(Utah 1976). Town of Aha v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). In the unpublished decision of Donner Crest Condominium Homeowners' 
Ass 'n v. Salt Lake City, 2005 WL 775306 (Utah App. 2005), this Court follows the 
Marshall line of cases and cites Determination Whether Zoning or Rezoning of 
Particular Parcel Constitutes Illegal Spot Zoning, 73 A.L.R. 5 223 as a help in 
drawing the legal-illegal spot-zone line. 
This case is the first Utah appeal where, by these definitions, the facts 
establish illegal reverse spot zoning resulting from the City's denial of Tolmans' 
rezone petition. 
In Marshall unlike this case, the "spot zones" were less restrictive "spots" 
for securing family conveniences and necessities. These "spot zones" were 
surrounded by more restrictive zones for residential uses. The Supreme Court 
distinguished this type of zoning from "reverse spot" zoning as follows: 
The cases relative to "spot zoning" are generally cases where a particular 
small tract, within a large district was specially zoned so as to impose upon 
it restrictions not imposed on surrounding lands. 
Marshall, 141 P.2d at 711 (emphasis supplied). In Crestview the Utah Supreme 
Court held that reverse "spot zoning" did not apply because of the large size of the 
tract. The Court distinguishes between legal and illegal "spot zoning" in the 
context of two types of "islands" as follows: 
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One type 
results when the zoning authority improperly limits the use which may be 
made of a small parcel located in the center of an unrestricted area. The 
second type of "island" results when most of a large district is devoted to a 
limited or restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in one or more 
spots in the district. 
Crestview 545 P.2d at 1151. This Court in the Ben Hame decision cited 
Crestview in discussing the term "spot zoning.". Ben Hame, 836 P.2d at fn 6. 
The law related to illegal "spot zones" and "reverse" spot zoning has been 
fleshed out in reported cases in other states. Many of these deal with fact patterns 
similar to the ones at bar. In Ross v. City ofYorba Linda, 1 Cal App. 4l 954, 2 
14 
Cal.Rep.2d 638 (Cal.App.Dist.4 1991) the Rosses owned an acre-plus lot in Yorba 
Linda. The property was zoned to allow only one dwelling per acre. If it had been 
rezoned to conform to the category to which most but not all of the surrounding 
lots conformed, they could have built another house on the property. 1 Cal.App.4th 
at 957. The Yorba Linda city council down the Rosses' rezone request. 
While every intendment favors the constitutionality of local land use 
restrictions, they cannot be arbitrary and discriminatory. A blatant example 
of discriminatory land use legislation is "spot zoning." Spot zoning is 
"[w]here a small parcel is restricted and given less rights than the 
surrounding Property . . ." As the Court said in Reynolds v. Barrett. . . "It 
is obvious that by a zoning ordinance a city cannot unfairly discriminate 
against a particular parcel of land. 
Here . . . a . . . restriction prevents a landowner from developing 
property consistent with the surrounding area. The character of the area is 
already suburban rather than rural; and, as the trial judge noted, the city 
would only be fooling itself to pretend otherwise 
Ross, 1 Cal.App.4th at 959-60, 961 (quoting Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal.2d 244, 
251,83P.2d29(1938)). 
Disengeneous pretexts have been the name of the game in Logan zoning 
since the arbitrary and capricious down-zoning of 1989. Here, the City planners 
no longer "pretend." They openly admit that multi family dwellings have been 
predominant in the neighborhood. 
The court in Ross goes on to debunk Yorba Linda's attempts to paint the 
autumn leaves green. 
. . . The only basis advanced, however, is the prevention of 
"encroaching urbanization.'* This point fails because the prevention of 
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"urbanization" ("suburbanization" would be more accurate) cannot be a 
rational basis where "urbanization" has already taken place. If a vacant 
acre is surrounded by high rises it would be absurd to claim that acre should 
be treated differently from surrounding property to prevent "urbanization." 
Whatever other reasons might justify a different classification (e.g., a need 
for park space), one could not claim development of the acre Would change 
the character of the area. 
The city's second attempt to distinguish Earner is to put forth the 
"domino theory" of creeping "zoning concessions." The city argues that if 
it is forced to allow the Rosses to build on their land consistent with the 
surrounding lots, other landowners will invariably use the Rosses' case as 
precedent in seeking their own zoning changes. 
. . .[T]he dark implication in the city's argument is that there are 
numerous "islands" in the city's zoning scheme, and that the "line must be 
drawn" at this one, lest others fall prey to "urbanization." Be that as it may, 
arbitrary line-drawing is antithetical to the individual right to equal 
protection of the law. The city appears to be afraid it will be forced to treat 
other landowners in a nondiscriminatory manner if it treats the Rosses in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. This is not an idea with much persuasive force. 
Ross at 962. 
The case before this Court is a more complete and ultimate case of "reverse 
spot" zoning than the one in Ross. Two of the lots bordering on the Ross lots were 
of about the same one acre size as theirs. The less restricted half acre lots were 
also contiguous. Thus theirs is called "virtually" surrounded. Ross at 958. 
Tolmans' lot is "totally" surrounded by multi-family uses, including the lot 
directly across the main arterial highway. 
Other cases do add to a broader perspective of different terminology used 
by courts to describe the equal protection, substantive due process and "takings" 
implications of "reverse spot" zoning. 
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A review of Florida iterations of "reverse spot zone" law doctrine is found 
in City Comm 'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d. 
1227 (Fla 3d DCA 3d 1989). The 68-acre cemetery, was zoned residential By the 
time of the rezone attempt, the main highway frontage, except for the Cemetery, 
had been rezoned commercial and fully developed. Its long back bordered on 
residential development. The rezone request was for the portion along the 
highway. 
The Florida Supreme Court...stated: "The block in which appellant's 
property lies is a 'veritable island' to borrow a term from appellants brief." 
Id, 1227 So.2d at 1231 (quoting from Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So.2d 122 (Fla. 
1957)). 
There must be a substantial and reasonable relationship between the 
need for zoning restrictions and the public health, morals, safety or welfare 
to justify interference, by exercise of the police power, with an owner's 
right to the enjoyment of his property. Only in the presence of such 
necessity will he be required to make a personal sacrifice for the good of 
the people. 
Id, at 1231 (citation omitted). 
"Where changed conditions create a situation where the zoning of 
appellants' property is so unreasonable as to constitute a taking of his 
property, then the courts are justified in striking down the arbitrary zoning 
classification.... We hold that the zoning of appellants' property is arbitrary 
and unreasonable and amounts to confiscatory regulation . . ." 
Id, at 1232 (quoting Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3DCA), 
cert, denied, 212 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1021, (1969)). 
"The property is then, except for the northernmost part, similar to the 
'veritable island' with which the Supreme Court of Florida was faced in 
Tollius v. City of Miami. .. The rationale applied in Kugel, Supra, appears 
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to be appropriate here. To deny the relief sought herein, as in Kugel, would 
constitute spot zoning in reverse." 
Id, at 1232 (quoting Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1968), cert, discharged, 226 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 
972(1970)). 
Running through all of these cases is the court's determination that it 
is entirely arbitrary and not at all "fairly debatable" on grounds that make 
sense . . . to deny the subject property owner equal treatment, although 
similarly situated. It is thought to be confiscatory of a person's property in 
such cases to prevent a property owner from utilizing his property in a 
certain way, when virtually all of his adjoining neighbors are not subject to 
such a restriction. Often, as previously noted, courts refer to such arbitrary 
refusals to rezone as "reverse spot zoning" because the refusal to rezone the 
subject property creates, in effect, a veritable zoning island . . . or a zoning 
peninsula . . . {A] governing authority, although having large discretionary 
zoning power, may not, under the guise of its police power, discriminate in 
such a blatant fashion against a property owner - - such arbitrary 
governmental action violates the owner's constitutional right to make 
legitimate use of his land. 
Id at 1233. 
In the Woodlawn case, the City claimed it was acting within its legislative 
discretion in denying the rezone request. The court rejected the notion use of the 
city's police power was "debatably" appropriate because the neighborhood had 
already changed. In dispensing with the City's claim of legislative discretion to 
deny the rezone, the Court again quoted the Kugel opinion as follows: 
"Appellee also suggests that this Court should treat the residential 
zoning of appellants' property as an exercise of the legislative authority of 
the city council, and that as such, it falls under the fairly debatable rule 
adhered to by this Court . . . The present case does not come within the 
bounds of this rule because the record clearly reveals that to ehange the 
residential zoning of appellant's property will in no way act to destroy the 
integrity of a neighborhood. The character of the property.. .has already 
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been changed by other actions of the municipality. The zoning regulation 
in question, as applied to appellants' property, is arbitrary and unreasonable 
and cannot be characterized as 'fairly debatable.' " 
Woodlawn, 553 So.2d at 1235-36 (quoting Kugel, 206 So.2d at 285). 
The chief difference between Tolmans' case and Dufau v. Parrish of 
Jefferson, 200 So.2d 335 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1967) is that the down-zoning there was 
from commercial to residential rather than from multi-family to single-family. 
The downzoned residential lots in Dufau were totally surrounded by commercial 
structures. 
". . . The court [in Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal.2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 
(1938)] stated that a city could not, by a zoning ordinance, unfairly 
discriminate against a particular parcel of land; that even if the general 
scheme of zoning was sound and valid, nevertheless the court could 
properly inquire as to whether the scheme of classification and districting 
had been applied fairly and impartially in each instance; and that obviously 
a city purporting to act under its police power could not create a business 
district, and entirely within it create an island' of one lot restricted to 
residential purposes, when no rational reason existed for such a 
classification." [quoting from State ex rel Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 
168 La. 172, 121 So. 613] 
Applying the above test, the conclusion is inescapable that 
Appellees' property is surrounded by commercial activity and, under the 
circumstances, their property would be completely valueless as residential 
property and would, in fact, be practically unsalable. After the .. .Council in 
1960 amended the original zoning ordinance and made the Square 
Commercial, it should have taken into consideration whether or not the 
property was, in fact, being utilized for commercial purposes, or whether 
there was such a change in the development in the Square that the original 
reclassification to Commercial in 1960 was erroneous before proceeding 
with the 1966 reclassification. 
The jurisprudential guidelines for zoning and zoning reclassification 
may be summarized as: 
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1. A homeowner has the right to rely on the rule of law that a 
classification made by ordinance will not be changed unless the change is 
for the public good. 
2. The power to amend is not arbitrary, it cannot be exercised merely 
because certain individuals want it done or think it ought to be done. 
3. Before a zoning board rezones property, there should be proof 
either that there was some mistake in the original zoning or that the 
character of the neighborhood has changed to such an extent that the 
reclassification ought to be made. 
4. The burden of proof of original mistake or the need for a 
substantial change is upon the proponents of the change." 
Id. Following this four-step guide: (1) Tolmans could rely on the rule that the 
1950 multifamily classification would not be changed unless the change was for 
the public good; (2) Logan City's power to make changes (1989, 1995, and 1996) 
is not arbitrary, and cannot be exercised merely because certain individuals think 
they can turn back time to the 1870s and undo all the apartment-building and 
house conversions that have been going on for over a century; (3) Before Logan 
City passed any of the amendments there should have been proof either that there 
was some mistake in the 1950 zoning scheme, or that the character of the 
neighborhood had actually changed to single-family to such an extent that the 
zoning classification also needed to be changed to match; and (4) Logan City has 
the burden to show that the mistake was made in 1950 or that the neighborhood 
character actually changed to single-family before the 1989 amendment. Any 
other rationalization for Logan's downzoning wipes out property rights. 
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The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago 96 N.E. 
2d 499 (111. 1951) discussed the constitutional limits of downzoning in the context 
of a Chicago amendatory downzone. 
. . . [W]here the amendment of a zoning ordinance is clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable action on the part of the city council, ostensibly taken to 
promote the public health, safety, comfort, morals or welfare, but having no 
substantial relation to any of those objects, such amendment is of no force 
or effect. This results not because the city may not repeal or amend the 
existing ordinance, but because in enacting the new legislation, as in 
enacting the original, it must stay within constitutional limitations, which 
exclude arbitrary and unreasonable action as lacking due process of law and 
forbid the confiscation of private property when necessary to preserve or 
promote the public welfare. 
It is clear from the record in this case that there is no actual or 
reasonable connection between the rezoning of plaintiffs' property from 
apartments to single-family residence and the public health, safety, comfort, 
morals or welfare. It is also clear from the undisputed testimony contained 
in the record that the erection of a multistoried apartment building on 
plaintiffs property would in no way injure or detract from the general 
welfare of the city or the general welfare of the community wherein the 
property is situated or from the general welfare of any community or 
neighborhood adjacent to said property, when the city or any such 
community is considered as a whole; and it is as a whole that a municipality 
or a community must be considered when zoning laws and ordinances are 
involved. 
Trust Co. of Chicago, 96 N.E.2d at 502, 504. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Manning 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982), 
in rejecting referendum as a remedy against zoning changes confirmed that 
landowners such as Tolman have other remedies available to vindicate their 
property rights: 
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Nor does this decision leave those who oppose zoning changes . . . 
without a remedy apart from the political one . . . County and city zoning 
ordinances can be set aside in courts if they are confiscatory, 
discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise without basis in reason. 
One way to make that showing . . .is to demonstrate that the amendment 
runs counter to the terms of or the policy established in the underlying law 
or ordinance or the zoning master plan. 
Id, 657 P.2d at 254 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the D-Z Scheme directly "countered" the "terms of the policy 
established in the underlying" 1950 plan-ordinance which was also the "zoning 
master plan." The injury to citizens' property rights is multiplied by the fact that 
in 1950 this traditional University neighborhood community was already 
substantially multi-family in character, and by 1989 had become overwhelmingly 
so in harmony with the policy established in the 1950 plan-ordinance. 
It is well within the scope of the complaint for Tolman's to prove that 
within the City, the political decision-makers have yielded to the special interests 
of a few vocal single-family advocates and not to the broader public good as 
exercise of the police power requires. The present City planners have 
affirmatively admitted the reality of overwhelming multi-family neighborhood 
characteristics, but appear unable to understand or implement the legal 
consequences that flow from those facts, as readily shown by the City's own 
submissions to the record. The political and administrative roadblocks have and 
will continue to stifle constitutional correction within the city, unless judicial 
action protects the property rights of those who would use their property. 
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II. TOLMANS5 CLAIMS ARE STILL VIABLE 
The City defends its position in part on the ground that it is too late for 
Tolmans or anyone else to question the validity of the 1989, 1995, or 1996 
amendments. It is not too late, however, for anyone adversely affected to 
challenge the constitutionality of a confiscatory, discriminatory, and irrational 
amendment. Mere acquiescence is not a bar. Tolmans have not waived their 
constitutional rights. 
A purchaser of property has the right to rely upon the classification 
which existed as to that property when the purchase was made and upon the 
rule of law that its classification will not be changed so long as the basis of 
public welfare remains the same. This does not mean however, that a 
purchaser of property upon which a restriction had previously been 
imposed by a zoning ordinance may not attack the validity of such 
restriction. Neither such purchase nor the fact that the purchaser or his 
grantor may have acquiesced in such classification will estop the purchaser 
from testing the validity of the ordinance, since this court is committed to 
the doctrine that mere acquiescence, irrespective of the length thereof, 
cannot legalize the clear usurpation of power which offends against the 
basic law. Zoning ordinances, whether they be original or amendatory 
legislation, and regardless of how long or by whom they have been 
recognized as legal, cannot be sustained if in violation of the constitution. 
Trust Co, of Chicago v. Chicago 96 N.E. 2d 499, 504 (111. 1951) (citations 
omitted). 
The City belatedly asserted in reply to the motion for summary judgment 
that the statute of limitations, Section 78-12-25(3), Utah Code, bars Tolmans' 
claims. This defense was not raised in the City's answer (R. 27-32), at least with 
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the specificity in pleading required by Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 
Even if limitations had been adequately pled, Tolmans should have been afforded 
the chance to show that the statute relied upon by the City was inapplicable, or 
was tolled, or that the right of action arose within the confines of the limit. 
Summary judgment was not appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Tolmans alleged their property was the subject of an unconstitutional 
reverse spot zone. Logan City's motion for summary judgment did not provide 
any facts that, if established, would defeat Tolmans' claims, but rather supplied 
evidence that supported the existence of an illegal spot-zone, and the 
unconstitutionality of the downzoning that occurred in the neighborhood since the 
original 1950 plan-ordinance. Tolmans supplied additional evidence to support 
their claim. The trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Tolmans could 
not possibly prove a case to support their complaint. The trial court's dismissal 
should be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. In the interest 
of judicial economy, instructions as to Utah law on the topic of reverse spot 
zoning would be helpful. 
1
 "Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to 
state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause 
of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or 
describing such statute specifically and definitely by section number, subsection 
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently 
clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the 
statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so 
barred." 
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Defendant Logan City ("City") submits this memorandum in support of its motion 
for summary judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action is a challenge to legislative land use decisions arising from a 
combination of the City's enactment of an ordinance in 1989 "downzoning" plaintiffs5 
("Tolmans") property from multi-family zoning to single-family residential zoning and the 
subsequent denial in 2004 of an application for rezoning. The 1989 zoning change was 
enacted in response to petitions by multiple property owners with the hope of 
maintaining or restoring the single-family residential character of the neighborhood. 
Though Tolmans5 property was subject to that zoning change, they did not timely 
challenge the rezoning. Therefore, to the extent Tolman's claims are based upon the 1989 
zoning decision, those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
In the mid-1990s, the City amended its General Plan and Land Development 
Ordinance to reflect the policy decision to maintain the designation of single family 
residential use in this area of the City Pursuant to statute, the Land Development 
Ordinance mandates compliance with the policies and provisions of the General Plan in 
any land use decisions. Tolmans5 application for rezoning was not consistent with the 
General Plan. 
The real nature of Tolmans' claims is a narrow statutory review under Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-1001. Under governing Utah law, the City's denial of the rezoning request, 
based on its noncompliance with the General Plan, is not arbitrary capricious or illegal. 
Tolmans' other claims are similarly unsupported by fact or law and therefore fail, entitling 
the City to summary judgment on those claims as well as on the § 10-9-1001 review. 
? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Tolmans5 property is a single-family home which was situated in a multi-
family zone when they purchased it in 1983. (Second Amended Complaint 11 5.) 
2. On August 10, 1989, the Logan City Planning Commission received 
petitions signed by sixty property owners requesting a downzoning of their properties 
from R3 to R2. (Planning Commission Minutes, August 10, 1989, relevant portions 
enclosed as Exhibit A.) 
3. The petitioners were concerned with preservation of the single-family 
residential nature of their properties, privacy issues, decreasing single-family residential 
property values, effects of increased density and absentee landlords. (Exhibit A.) 
4. The Planning Commission voted unanimously to review the rezoning 
proposed by the petitioners. (Exhibit A.) 
5. At its September 14, 1989 meeting, the Planning Commission considered 
the rezoning proposal and voted unanimously to recommend the rezone to the Municipal 
Council. (Planning Commission Minutes, September 14, 1989, relevant portions enclosed 
as Exhibit B.) 
6. At the same meeting another petition was presented by additional 
homeowners requesting that the downzoning be expanded to include their properties. 
(Exhibit B.) 
7. On October 19, 1989, the Municipal Council held a public hearing on the 
property owners' rezoning proposal u About forty citizens were present who favored the 
proposal." Three individuals opposed the rezoning. The Council voted unanimously to 
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rezone the properties from R3 to R2. (Logan Municipal Council minutes, October 19, 
1989, relevant portions enclosed as Exhibit C.) 
8. The ordinance rezoning the properties was approved by the mayor on 
November 2, 1989. (Ordinance 89-52, copy enclosed as Exhibit D.) 
9. Tolmans did not challenge the zoning amendment, though it affected their 
property as well as that of others. 
10. After two years of study, the Municipal Council adopted a revised General 
Plan for the City of Logan on June 16, 1995. (Council findings in Ordinance No. 96-20, 
copy enclosed as Exhibit E.) 
11. Consistent with the General Plan, the Council adopted a zoning map and 
Land Development Ordinance on March 6, 1996. (Exhibit E.) 
12. The General Plan recognizes the tension between single family residential 
and multi-family uses within neighborhoods and the City's efforts to balance the interests 
involved. 
Logan is a City of neighborhoods. Prior to preparing the General 
Plan, the City Council and Planning Commission were facing' 
requests from each of the City's residential neighborhoods to decrease 
the permitted density for new residential development The actions 
sought, called downzoning requests, were intended to stop the 
proliferation o£fourplex residential development in what were basically 
established single family neighborhoods. 
Zoning is an ongoing process intended to recognize changes in 
community values and development needs. The City invested 
extensive time and emotional energy into consideration of zone 
changes in each neighborhood. The General Plan calls for new 
zoning districts, which requires an area-by-area evaluation of the City 
to determine which new zoning district is applied to what area. The 
issues and concerns that generated the reductions in densities during 
the earlv 1990s had not changed at the time the General Plan was 
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proposed for adoption in 1995. These values and concerns are still a 
part of die evaluation process for zone changes. 
The greatest challenge in the General Plan is to balance the need for 
housing with desire to maintain neighborhood -character. 
(Logan City General Plan, portions enclosed as Exhibit F.) 
13. Under the new ordinance, Tolmans5 property and those others which had 
been zoned R2 were now designated as SFR (single family residential). (Exhibit E.) 
14. Tolmans applied to the City for rezoning of their property and others, a 
total of 32 properties over approximately 8 acres on June 24, 2004. (Copy of application 
enclosed as Exhibit G.) 
15. At die time of Tolman's application for rezone, die City was conducting 
studies for preparation of a new General Plan. 
16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-303(6)(b), the City's Land 
Development Code mandates consistency of land development with die provisions of the 
General Plan. (Land Development Code § 17.01.040.) 
17. The Code also recognizes that the General Plan consists of policy decisions 
of the City. 
The General Plan is the adopted policies of the Municipal Council. 
The general Plan represents a lengthy public participation process and 
incorporates long range goals, identified policies and an 
implementation program. The content of the General Plan may be 
cited as a basis for making decisions or as part of the finding to 
support actions initiated by this Land Development Code. The 
General Plan is adopted as part of this code by reference. The 
General Plan provides the policies that enable the specific regulations 
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of the Land Development Code to be carried out. Implementation 
measures in the General Plan provide direction for specific measures 
within the Land Development Code. When there is a conflict 
between the General Plan and the Land Development Code, if the 
General Plan provides precise development standards, the General 
Plan is to be used. If the General Plan provides policy laftguage and 
no specific development standards, the Land Development Code's 
specific measures are to prevail. 
(Land Development Code § 17.01.040.E.) 
18. The City's planning staff prepared an evaluation of the Tolman application 
on July 14, 2004. The staff recognized that multi-family use is likely the best use in the 
area and that preliminary results of the general plan revision process would probably 
support the rezoning. (Staff Report, July 14, 2004, copy enclosed as Exhibit H.) 
19. The staff* believed the rezone request was premature, implying that it might 
be better under the revised general plan. (Id.) 
20. The staff also recognized the requirement that rezoning be consistent with 
the general plan and that this rezoning might constitute illegal spot zoning. (Id.) 
21. The staff recommended denial of the request because it was incompatible 
with the express provision of the General Plan objective to "restore the single family scale, 
character, and stability to the area." (Id.) 
22. Tolmans' rezoning request was heard by the Planning Commission on 
Julv 22, 2004. The Commission voted unanimously, with one abstention, to recommend 
to the Council denial of the rezoning application. (Planning Commission Minutes, 
July 22, 2004, relevant portions enclosed as Exhibit I.) 
23. The Municipal Council took up the rezone application on August 3, 2004. 
The minutes indicate the basis for the recommended denial. 
6 
The staff recommendation to deny the rezone was made because of 
the belief that Mr. Tolman's request was contrary to the current 
General Plan and 1996 citywide rezone. The Planning Commission 
also recommended denial, finding that the request was incompatible 
with the current General Plan and not supported by other planning 
documents, including the 1996 rezone. 
The Council set a public hearing on the request for August 24, 2004. (Municipal Council 
Minutes, August 3, 2004, relevant portions enclosed as Exhibit J.) 
24. At the public hearing, a majority of individuals opposed the rezoning. After 
discussion, the Council voted unanimously to deny the rezoning request based on the staff 
and commission recommendations. (Municipal Council Minutes, August 24, 2004, 
relevant portions enclosed as Exhibit K.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY'S DENIAL OF TOLMAN'S REZONING APPLICATION 
WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
Tolman's claim that the denial of their rezoning request was arbitrary and 
capricious. Though they do not recognize it in their complaint, this is actually a petition 
for statutory review of the City's decision under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 which 
prescribes a very narrow judicial review of the City's decision. 
The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious 
or illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3).l 
1
 This section was renumbered 10-9a-801 by Senate Bill 60 adopted by the 2005 
Utah Legislature, but the standard remains the same. 
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The City's decision to deny Tolmans' request for rezoning was a legislative one. 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp.. 2003 UT 16,11 11, 70 P.3d 47, 51. While municipal land 
use decisions are afforded a "great deal" of judicial deference, legislative zoning decisions 
"are entitled to particular deference.55 Id. Ml 10, 12 at 50-51. The standard for 
determining whether a legislative land use decision is arbitrary or capricious is the "highly 
deferential55 determination of whether it is reasonably debatable that the decision could 
promote the general welfare. Id. K 14 at 51-52. 
In Bradley, a landowner appealed from the city's denial of his request to rezone 
property from low density residential-agricultural to high density multi-family residential. 
The Supreme Court discussed the extensive history of its treatment of municipal land use 
decisions, noting that it had previously held that "it is cthe court's duty to resolve all 
doubts in favor* of the municipality, and the burden is on the plaintiff challenging a 
municipal land use decision to show that the municipal action was clearly beyond the city's 
power." Bradley U 12 at 51 (citation omitted). The court then discussed the application 
of the reasonably debatable standard. 
In general, because a zoning classification reflects a legislative policy 
decision, we will not interfere with that decision except in the most 
extreme cases. The guiding principle behind our interpretation of 
legislative zoning decisions is that we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the municipality: Though a municipality may 
have a myriad of competing choices before it, the selection of one 
method of solving the problem in preference to another is entirely 
within the discretion of the city; and does not, in and of itself 
evidence an abuse of discretion. The propriety of the zoning decision 
need only be reasonably debatable. 
Bradley 11 24 at 54 (punctuation, citations omitted). 
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Of significance to the issue before this court, the Bradley court recognized the 
appropriateness of a legislative decision relying on the city's general plan. 
Payson City's reliance on the General Plan as a basis for its decision is 
precisely the kind of legislative decision that should be left to the city 
council and undisturbed by the judiciary. It is not up to the court to 
determine whether Payson City made the right decision or the best 
decision in relying on the General Plan . . . We evaluate only whether 
it was reasonably debatable that the decision reached would promote 
the general welfare. Payson City's reliance on the long-term policy 
preferences embodied in the General Plan satisfies the reasonably 
debatable standard. 
Bradley 11 26 at 55 (emphasis added). 
As in Bradley, the issue before this Court is not whether approval of Tolmans5 
rezoning request would have been a better decision. Nor is the issue whether, ultimately 
multi-family zoning may turn out to be a better long-term policy choice for these 
properties. The simple issue is whether the City's denial based upon lack of compliance 
with its General Plan passes the arbitrary and capricious challenge. The Bradley court has 
already held that it does. 
Moreover, Logan City's General Plan is not merely advisor)". The Land 
Development Code mandates that any zoning amendments be consistent with the General 
Plan. In turn, the General Plan reflects the carefully weighed policy decision to support 
attempts to maintain or restore the single-family nature of the SFR zones. 
Admittedly, it is possible that the revised General Plan may reach a different policy 
decision more favorable to the Tolmans' request. However, the weighing of policy issues 
in the revision of the General Plan had not been completed at the time of the application 
and could not legally be considered the legislative policy decision of the City. That 
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legislative policy was defined by the 1995 General Plan and Tolmans did not apply for an 
amendment to that General Plan. The Council was required by ordinance to follow the 
long-term policy decision reflected in the General Plan. Its action in doing so cannot be 
arbitrary or capricious.2 The City is therefore entitled as a matter of law to summary 
judgment. 
II. TOLMANS5 INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS FAIL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Tolmans claim that the 1989 decision to downzone their property and the 2004 
denial of their rezoning application constitute inverse condemnation under Article I, 
section 22. In doing so, they make two inconsistent allegations: (1) the decisions denied 
them "all economically viable use of their property/5 (Second Amended Complaint, 11 19), 
and (2) took from them cca major portion of the reasonably expected return on their 1983 
investment in their home property55 (Id. UH 7, 8.) The first claim is unsupported by any 
evidence and the second provides no support for an inverse condemnation claim. 
The threshold weakness in Tolmans5 takings claim, however, is that the claim, to 
the extent it is based upon the 1989 downzoning, is time-barred. There is no specified 
limitation for the bringing of an Article I, section 22 takings claim, therefore, under Utah 
statute, litigation must be commenced, at the latest, within four years. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-12-25(3).3 
2
 Tolmans have identified nothing done by the City which constitutes a violation 
of statutes or its ordinances and could be determined to be illegal in a § 10-9-1001 review. 
The decision to deny the rezoning is therefore not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
3
 It is likely that the two-year limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(4) applies 
to this <rla«n In any event, a takings claim based upon a zoning decision made fourteen 
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Moreover, Tolmans' takings claims lack legal support. The threshold inquiry in a 
takings action is whether the plaintiff has a protectable property interest. Intermountain 
Sports. Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation. 2004 UT App 405,11 8, 103 P.3d 716, 71849. 
Tolmans have no such interest. 
"It is established that an owner of property holds it subject to zoning ordinances 
enacted pursuant to a [city's] police power." Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of 
Logan. 617 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1980). See also Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 758 
P.2d 897, 901 (Utah 1988) (owner acquires protected property interest or vested right in 
current zoning only upon application for development consistent with the existing 
zoning); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 
2899, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (noting that property owners should expect uses of 
property to be restricted by legitimate use of police powers and that some rights must 
yield to the police power). Utah courts have rejected unilateral expectations as a basis for 
a protected property interest. E.g., Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 
1995) (in which court looked to federal law and other state law to identify scope of 
protected property interest). See also Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,11 23, 
67 P. 3d 466 (citing federal law holding that unilateral expectation is insufficient to create a 
constitutionally protected property right). Tolmans have, at best, a unilateral expectation 
that their property be rezoned for multi-family use. 
The general rule is that, while the use and ownership of property are fundamental 
rights, a property owner has no vested, protected property right in a contemplated 
years prior to the commencement of this action is time-barred. 
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development or entitlement to a particular zoning designation.4 State courts which have 
examined the issue have consistently held that a property owner has no protected property 
right in any particular zoning of property, including the existing zoning absent an 
application for development under that zoning, which would support state constitutional 
takings or due process claims.5 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that routine regulation which has an 
impact on property value does not necessarily require compensation under Article I, 
section 22. 
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do 
with and on the owner's property: Those regulations may have a 
significant impact on the utility or value of the property yet they 
generally do not require compensation under article I, section 22. 
Only when the governmental action rises to the level of a taking or 
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay 
compensation. 
Colman v. Utah State Land BcL 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990). 
4
 Marshall v, Bd. of County Commas. 912 ESupp 1456, L464 (D. Wyo 1996); 
Jacobs, Visconsi 8c Tacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 715 ESupp. 1000, 1004-05 (D. Kan. 
1989); MacDonakt Sommer 8c Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-351, 106 
S.Ct. 2561, 2566-2567, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). 
5
 Weatherford v. City of San Marcos, 157 S.W3d 473, 483 (Tex.App. 2004) 
(property owner has no "vested right in any particular zoning classification'5); City of 
Suffolk ex rel. Herbert v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for City of Suffolk. 580 S.E.2d 796, 798 
(Va. 2003) ("Privately held land is subject to applicable local zoning ordinances whether 
enacted before or after the property was acquired. Generally, landowners have no property 
right in anticipated uses of their land since they have no vested property right in the 
continuation of the land's existing zoning status."); Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank 
8c Trust. 658 P.2d 872, 877 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (property owners5 interest in their 
property <<:does not amount to a vested right in the maiiMtwmerof a particular zoning 
classification") 
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To state a claim for relief for an alleged taking arising from application of zoning 
ordinances, a plaintiff must allege and prove that he has been deprived of all reasonable 
uses of his land. 
[F]or there to be a taking under a zoning ordinance, the landowner 
must show that he has been deprived of all reasonable uses of his 
land. For example, almost all zoning decisions have some economic 
impact on property values. However, mere diminution in property 
value is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking bv 
regulation. 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305, 311-12 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). In other 
words, a regulatory taking only occurs when there is no remaining economically viable use 
for the property. 
The state has broad authority to regulate or prevent certain uses of 
land under its police power; it need compensate a landowner only if 
the regulation deprives him or her of all economically viable use of 
the land, i.e., when it effects a "regulatory taking.53 
National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 925 (Utah 
1993) (emphasis added). 
The term "economically viable use" does not equate to highest and best use. For 
example, in Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1998), the 
Court of Appeals, applying federal law which similarly requires deprivation of all 
economically viable use, concluded that a substantial reduction in value (43% reduction) 
did not deprive a property of economically viable use so long as some reasonable value 
remained and the reduction did not support a takings claim. 
Tolmans' takings claims fail on two counts. They possess no property interest 
entitled to Article I, section 22 protection. They also are unable to produce any evidence 
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that they have no remaining economically viable use of their property In reality the fact 
that they own property within the City located in a residential zone, strongly implies that 
there is some value to the property for the purposes for which it is zoned. There is no 
evidence that the denial of the rezoning even diminished the value of the property: Any 
claim of reduced value based upon the 1989 downzoning is time-barred. 
III. TOLMANS' ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 DUE PROCESS CLAIMS ARE 
FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY UNSUPPORTED. 
Tolmans allege due process violations under Article I, section 7. They do not 
bother to identify whether these are procedural or substantive due process claims. There is 
nothing in their Second Amended Complaint which would support a procedural due 
process claim and, in fact, the record establishes that they were afforded procedural due 
process.6 
The first step in a due process analysis is, as in the takings analysis, the 
identification of a constitutionally protected property interest. State in Interest of 
Summers v. WulfFenstein. 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980). As discussed above, Tolmans 
have no such interest. See City of Livonia v. Dept. of Social Services, 333 N.W2d 151, 
160-61 (Mich.App. 1983) ("the mere fact that the individual plaintiffs may have relied 
upon the continuance of existing zoning does not give them a property interest entiding 
them to due process protection.55); W.C.8t A.N. Miller Development Co. v. Dist. of 
Columbia Zoning Common, 340 A.2d 420, 424 (D.C. 1975) ("while property rights may 
6Any due process claims based upon the 1989 downzoning are also time-barred 
because they were not brought within two years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(4). To the 
extent that § 78-12-28 may be deemed prospective only then the extant catchall four-year 
provision in § 78-12-25(3) agplks. 
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not be taken away without due process of law, a property owner has no right to a 
particular zoning classification of his property5') Absent a legally cognizable property 
interest, Tolmans' due process claims fail as a matter of law. 
Moreover, in a substantive due process challenge, a zoning ordinance will be upheld 
under the reasonably debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary and capricious analysis 
discussed above. 
In reviewing [a] substantive due process challenge, we focus not on 
the ordinance's alleged or potential effects, but on the ordinance itself 
and the reasons given by [the] City for its enactment. 
If the ordinance and the stated policies and reasons underlying it do, 
within reason, debatably promote the legitimate goals of increased 
public health, safety or general welfare, we must allow [the] City's 
legislative judgment to control. 
Smith Investment at 253. It is well-established that courts do not substitute their 
judgment for that of the city's legislative body Id. at 253. 
As discussed in Point I above, the record provides more than adequate evidence 
that it is at least reasonably debatable whether the City's zoning decision is reasonable. In 
fact, the Supreme Court in Bradley has concluded that legislative reliance on the General 
Plan as a basis for denying a rezoning is reasonably debatable and not arbitrary or 
capricious. There is, therefore, no basis for Tolmans' substantive due process claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts which are material to the City s^ motion are-contained in the 
legislative record. Logan City's denial of Tolmans' request for rezoning was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal under governing Utah law: Their claims of inverse condemnation and 
15 
deprivation of due process similarly fail for lack of factual or legal support. The City is 
therefore entided to summary judgment in its favor on all of the claims asserted in the 
plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, as a matter of law. 
DATED this of June, 2005. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
121783.1 
r Defendant Logan City 
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CHRIS DAINES LAW 
David R, Daines, Bar # 0801 
135 North Main, Suite 108 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Phone: (435) 752-1750 Fax: 753-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS W. TOLMAN and VERLA F. AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS 
TOLMAN, W. TOLMAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 040101962 CR 
LOGAN CITY and JOHN and JANE DOES Judge Gordon J. Low 
1-20 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE) 
I, Thomas W. Tolman, being first duly sworn on oath depose and say: 
1. I am one of the Plaintifls in the above entitled action. I have read the Second Amended 
Complaint filed herein in my behalf dated April 18,2005 consisting of seventeen paragraphs, and 
a prayer for relief on seven total pages. I hereby verify that I have read and studied the same, and 
that the contents of the Second Amended Complaint are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge, information and belief, and, as to matters stated on belief, I believe them to be true. I 
hereby incorporate the Second Amended Complaint herein by this reference. 
1 
2. Neither me nor my wife have ever taken any action in reliance on the Logan City re-
zoning ordinances of 1989 or 1996, which down-zoned the property on which our subject home is 
located, from multiple family dwelling to a single family dwelling zone. When we purchased the 
home in 1983 we relied on the Zoning Ordinance 1950 then in effect, which established the multi-
family zoning and the predominant multi-family uses in the zone that assured us that we would be 
able to sell the home for a reasonable price surrounded by multiple dwellings. 
3. Our sole purpose in applying for the rezone was to change the zoning of our home and 
lot to conform to multi-family zone in accord with the surrounding uses so we could sell it for a 
reasonable price, or at least convert it into a feasible investment property. We were diverted from 
applying for our single lot rezone to include about thirty other surrounding lots pursuant to the 
advice and direction of ofiBcials of the Logan City Department of Community Development under 
the following circumstances. That diversion was very costly in time and work. It required the 
promotion of a petition signed by the other owners in the re-zone area and other neighboring 
owners (See Exhibit A) . It also required extensive surveying of the actual multi-dwelling versus 
single family uses in an extended area (See Exhibit B). This work and delay would not have been 
necessary or useful in obtaining a re-zone of our lot if the City had accepted our application for 
our single lot rezone because it is totally surrounded by multiple dwelling uses. 
4. About three months before filing our application on June 24th 2004,1 went to the 
Logan City Department of Community Development to explore the possibility of getting the 
zoning of our former family home changed to multiple dwelling to conform to the surrounding 
multi-family uses and former zoning so that it would be saleable and rentable at a reasonable 
price approaching market value. The fact that it had not been so saleable (or rentable) at near 
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market value had resulted in a family financial crisis that was so severe that we had no funds with 
which to pay for legal advice on whether to file for our single lot re-zone or include multiple 
surrounding lots. Therefore, I relied on the advice and direction given by the oflBcials of the City's 
Department of Community Development 
5. On my first visit to the office in about March 2004,1 was referred to City Planner, 
Michelle Mechem, After explaining the problem to her she told me that single lot re-zone 
applications had rarely been approved and that my best chance from past history was to include a 
large area with multiple adjacent lots and supporting signatures on the petition of the owners in 
and surrounding the area of the proposed re-zone. I relied on the City's advice and direction, did 
not file for a single lot re-zone, promoted the area re-zone by petition signed by all owners within 
the area included in our re-zone application and other owners in the area (Exhibits A and B). In 
addition, I made extensive surveys to establish which lots in the area were in feet, either multi-
family uses or single family uses, and the number of units in each structure, in order to establish 
the details of the well known multiple dwelling use characteristic that is and has been the 
predominant characteristic of the neighborhood since and before the first ordinance of 1950 (see 
Exhibit C and City Exhibit H pg. 2). Then on June 24th 2004, in accord with the advice and 
direction of the City, I filed the multiple lot re-zone application, rather than for our lot alone. The 
timing of this application was specifically because the City Planners office had said that they were 
submitting their new proposed master zoning plan and by submitting at this time I would be 
following them through the system. 
o 
6. Beginning about May 2004 and continuing, I have made a survey and investigation of 
the existing uses of dwellings on lots, including the number of dwellings in the buildings on those 
lots, and the dwellings units per acre in a broad seventeen block area surrounding my lot and 
largely in the same existing zone. The elements that I have considered in arriving at the 
conclusions included; interviews with owners, tenants and neighbors; the number of postal mail 
boxes; the number of apparent dwelling unit entry doors; power and gas meters; and, fifty-two 
years of experience living and visiting in the neighborhood, as well as other factors. 
7. The results of my investigation-survey as regards the uses of lots on the four blocks 
centered one lot west of my lot at the intersection of Fourth North and Fifth East streets are 
illustrated and summarized on Exhibit B attached hereto consisting of five pages. The last four 
pages are recent plats of those four Blocks from the Cache County recorders office which have 
been marked to show the lot by lot results of my survey. Our home and lot at 425 East Fourth 
North, fronts on a four lane highway and principal traffic artery designated on the plats as 
'Tourth North Street". It has turning lanes with parallel parking on both sides and a speed limit of 
40 miles per hour It is one of the principal traffic arteries in the, the valley and points east. It is 
also US Highway 89, and designated by Logan City as "University Boulevard". It is also the main 
arterial highway connecting downtown Logan, five blocks to the west to Utah State University, 
two blocks East of our home. It has always been the main entry to and through the University 
campus. The eastern extension of US 89 beyond campus is the highway through Logan Canyon 
and continues on to Yellowstone Park. It connects with other highways going to points easterly 
from Cache Valley. The block East of our Block 14 boarders on the west of the Campus and has 
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always been zoned for multiple dwelling housing. The four blocks included in Exhibit B have 
always been the prime location for University student, staff, and personnel housing in 
predominantly multi-dwelling housing as described in Exhibit B and City Exhibit H. 
8.1 am 54 years old and have an associates degree in electronics from the Utah Technical 
College. I was raised in my family home at 393 East 4th North Street until 1970. For 13 years 
thereafter I was in the Military, school and work, living away from Logan but frequently visiting 
my family and friends who lived in this neighborhood. My ancestors have lived in this 
neighborhood since about 1916.1 moved back into the neighborhood in a rented home for one 
year and purchased the subject home in 1983 where we lived and raised our nine children. After 
most of our children were gone from home we purchased and moved into another home in the 
same general area, more suitable to our needs. I thus have intimate knowledge of this 
neighborhood. 
9. The summary and conclusions of this survey illustrated in Exhibit B are as follows: 
a. Oar Re-zone parts of BUc !4 pg. 2 & BIk-11 pg. 3 outlined in Blue: The area in our 
re-zone application included 31 lots split between Blocks 14 and 11. There are 6-24% of owners, 
including us, who have single dwelling units on their lots and 25-74% have multi family dwellings. 
The parcels owned by those 6 single family owners, including us, are totally isolated and 
surrounded by the multiple dwelling uses. Those owners, and all of the owners of lots in our re-
zone area (and neighboring owners) signed our re-zone petition (Exhibit A). In terms of dwelling 
unit numbers rather than structures, there are 71 dwelling units; 63- 89% are in multiple dwelling 
structures and 8-11% in single family structures. By the City's density-zone measure, this would 
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be in a Multi Family High zone. ( See "f infra ). 
b. Our whole Blk 14 pg. 3: The survey results in our full Block 14 are as follows: There 
are 40 structures in the Block; 25 -63% are multiple dwellings and 15-37% are single family 
dwellings. Of those 15 single dwellings, 6 including ours are totally surrounded by multiple 
dwelling units, and, 6 other lots in 3 groups of 2 are totally surrounded by multi-dwelling units. 
From the view of dwelling unit numbers, rather than structures, there are 80 dwelling units with 
16-20% in single family and 64-80% in multi-family units. By the City's density-zone measure this 
should be a Multi Family Medium zone. (See "f' infra ). 
c. Whole Blk 11 pg. 3. The "character of the neighborhood" results in Block Eleven are 
as follows: There are 30 structures in the Block; 21-77% are multi-dwelling units and 9-23% are 
single dwelling units. The 9 single-dwelling lots are each surrounded by multi-dwelling lots by 
counting the three adjacent lots owned by the one petitioner (Hansen/Oliver). Otherwise, 8 of the 
9 single family lots are totally surrounded by multiple family lots. From the view of dwelling unit 
numbers rather than structures, there are 80 dwelling units with 16 - 20% in single family, and, 
74 - 80 % in multi-family units. By the City's density-zone measure this should be a Multi Family 
High zone. (See "f." infra). 
d. Whole Blk 10 pg. 4. The "character of the neighborhood" results in Block Ten are as 
follows: There are 33 structures in the Block; 18 - 55% are mufti-dwelling units and 15- 45% are 
single family. From the view of the 88 dwelling unit numbers, versus structures, 73-80% are in 
multi dwelling structures and 15-20% in single family structures. By the City's density-zone 
measure this should be a Multi Family Medium Zone. (See "P infra) 
6 
e. Whole BIk 15 pg. 5. The "character of the neighborhood" results in Block 15 are as 
follows: There are 39 structures in the Block; 25-64% are multi-dwelling structures and 14-36% 
are single dwelling structures. From the view of dwelling unit numbers rather than structures, 
there are 102 dwelling units with 14-14% in single family dwellings, and single family units and 
88- 86% in multi-family units. By the City's density-zone measure that should be a Multi Family 
High zone. (See " f infra). 
f. City dwelling units per acre zoning standard application: For City planning 
purposes they use a measure of units per acre as the designator for the respective zone. i.e. 
Single Family Residential (SFR) is described as 7 or less units per acre. Likewise, Multi-Family 
Medium (MFM) is 11 or less units per acre; MF High is 14 or less units per acre; MF Very High 
is 32 or less units per acre. All four of the blocks are currently zoned SFR. If we look at the 
statistics from the block survey we find the following results: 
Block 10 = 9.1 units per acre or what should be a MFM ( "Multi Family Medium") zone 
Block 11 = 11.28 units per acre or what should be a MFH ( "Multi Family High") zone 
Block 14=10 units per acre or what should be a MFM zone. 
Block 15 = 12.75 units per acre or what should be a MFH zone. 
Rezone Parts of Blocks 11 and 14 = 12.75 units per acre or a MFH zone. 
10. The following survey data in the Block East of Block 11, extending from 6th to 7th East 
(Campus) and south of Fourth North, is included only to refute the City's claim to the effect that 
60 property owners in the rezone area petitioned for "downzoning of their properties" in the first 
downzone application process of 1989. (See Plaintiffs Memo Opposing Motion, I FACTS 
7 
Response to 2). In that Block there are 14 total lots-structures of which 7 are multiple family 
dwellings and 7 are single family dwellings, 
11. As the owner of my home and lot and the additional qualifying factors hereafter stated, 
I have an opinion that the fair market value of the home and lot: (A) Subject to the present 
downzone restriction of use as single family residence, surrounded by actual multi-family 
residences in a predominantly multi-family general neighborhood; (1) We have attempted to sell 
on our own without listing (general sale attempt history). (2) The only offers received were early 
on and well below appraised value of $130,000 before we discovered we couldn't sell it as a 
single family home because of the overwhelming multi-family nature of the neighborhood. (3) 
Commentary such as 'it is zoned wrong to pay full value, if it were zoned multiple I would make 
a better offer' types of statements. (4) The mortgage at the time of those offers, summer of 
2002, was about $115,000, one offer was for about $70,000 and the other for $100,000. 
12. Because of the family financial crisis created by the downzoning, wherein we have had 
to spend down savings and increase debt for upkeep and mortgage expense, we are without funds 
with which to pay real estate appraisers for court use affidavits and would be unable to pursue a 
court remedy except for the fact that our attorneys are serving pro bono. My opinions are in part 
based on the value of the conversion from a VA loan to a conventional loan at the time we traded 
homes, also comparable valuation estimates given by realtors I was considering listing with, and 
most recently an appraisal by a potential refinance company in October 2005. Lending companies 
look at this extra property as investment property and so don't loan as high a ratio and expect 
money in the bank to cover vacancy. Bank accounts are low since they are reduced to 
8 
compensate for the limited funds we can obtain in rent by only putting "three unrelated people" in 
a six bedroom house that housed 11 individuals when my family was living there! My opinion of 
market values based on the assumption of change in zoning to multi-family is based partly on my 
4 
limited knowledge of sales of properties with apparent comparable elements in the general area 
and other factors. Real estate appraisers will not provide opinions-based on future assumptions or 
existing conditions for court purposes in the absence of substantial fees in advance. 
Signed and dated this /j day of April, 2006. 
Thomas W. Tolman 
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JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
ROBERT C. KELLER (4861) 
WILLIAMS & H U N T 
257 East 250 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Phone: 801-521-5678 
Fax: 801-364-4500 
KYMBER D. HOUSLEY (6892) 
L O G A N CITY A T T O R N E Y 
255 N. Main 
P. O. Box 527 
Logan, U T 84323-0527 
Phone: 435-716-9084 
Fax: 435-716-9081 
Attorneys for Defendant Logan City 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




LOGAN CITY and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-
20, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF LOGAN CITY'S 
M O T I O N F O R SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040101962 CR 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
Defendant Logan City submits this memorandum in response to plaintiffs' 
opposition to its morion for summary judgment. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Because Toimans have missed the point of the City's motion, it is important to 
clarify the issues before the Court. There are three. First, plaintiffs' claims based upon 
actions taken prior to the August 24, 2004, denial of their rezoning application are time-
barred as a matter of law. Secondly, the City's denial of Tolmans5 rezoning application 
was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under governing Utah law. Thirdly/there are no 
disputed facts which are material to these two dispositive issues. The City is therefore 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Tolmans have submitted an affidavit and opposition memorandum, both of which 
fail to either create an issue of fact or argue legal authority which is relevant to the City's 
motion for summary judgment. While Tolmans attempt to create factual disputes, they 
mistakenly focus on the background facts provided by the City which are material to the 
City's motion only to the limited extent that they relate to the running of the applicable 
statutes of limitation. Tolmans' sole legal argument is related to the actions for which 
their claims are time-barred. Their legal focus is the claim that the 1989 downzoning of 
their property was somehow an illegal "spot zoning." That legal argument is immaterial 
because the actions to which it is directed are barred by the statutes of limitation. 
Tolmans have apparendy conceded their inverse condemnation claim and their 
Article I, section 7 due process claim. They have completely failed to respond to the City's 
legal authorities which address those claims. 
RESPONSE TO TOLMANS' TREATMENT 
OF THE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tolmans5 memorandum and affidavit fail to creat any disputed issues of fact which 
are material to the City's Motion for summary judgment. In an attempt to create issues of 
fact, Tolmans simply disagree with most of the City's fact statements and have submitted 
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the Affidavit of Thomas W Tolman. Neither of these is sufficient to create a fact issue to 
avoid summary judgment. 
Tolmans5 responses to the City's fact statements are merely argumentative 
characterizations of their own view of the facts. The responses contain no "citation to 
relevant materials" as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah R.Civ.P. More significantly, 
Tolmans5 take issue primarily with the factual assertions in UK 1-11, which the City 
provided only for two purposes: (1) historical background to give context to the claims; 
and (2) to establish dates for statute of limitations purposes. It is worth noting, however, 
that the minutes and other City records provided are competent evidence and speak for 
themselves. If Tolmans wish to challenge that evidence, they must do more than make 
conclusory arguments about their own interpretation of the facts. 
The Affidavit of Thomas W Tolman, although also largely conclusory, asserts a 
different set of facts which has no relevance to the legal issues presented to the Court by 
the City's motion for summary judgment. Tolmans5 "Additional Statement of Facts," 
based upon the affidavit, demonstrate the lack of materiality to the decision which is being 
challenged. The first fact statement is that the rezoning denial "resulted in a major 
diminution of the fair market value" of the property. Diminution of value is simply not 
material to the downzoning issue. See Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 
(Utah App. 1998) (downzoning resulted in 43 percent diminution in market value). 
The second fact demonstrates the character of the properties at issue and 
surrounding properties to argue that the Tolman property would be more properly zoned 
for higher density use. Those facts, however, are immaterial for at least two reasons 
J 
First, the City's decision was based upon the ordinance requirement that any rezoning be 
compatible with the City's General Plan. The General Plan did not permit the higher 
density zoning, and Tolmans did not apply for a General Plan amendment* to do so. 
Secondly, under governing law, the Court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for 
that of local zoning officials. Even assuming for the limited purposes of this argument 
that it might be appropriate to zone the property in question for a higher density or 
intensity of use, the mere existence of an alternative choice does not make the City's 
decision arbitrary or capricious. 
Summary judgment is often appropriate despite the existence of collateral factual 
disputes where the disputed facts are not material to the legal questions presented. E.g., 
Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 655 (Utah App. 1995) (summary judgment appropriate 
despite multiple disputed facts where those facts were immaterial). To constitute a fact 
which would preclude summary judgment, the fact must be material to the applicable rule 
of law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). The disputed facts 
advanced by Tolmans are immaterial to the fundamental legal issues presented to this 
Court by the City's motion. 
Because the facts which Tolmans attempt to advance are not material to the issue 
before the Court, i.e., whether the denial of their rezoning application was arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal, they cannot create issues of fact to avoid summary judgment. Under 
the undisputed facts established by the legislative record relating to this matter, the City is 
therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TOLMANS' CLAIMS BASED UPON ACTIONS TAKEN PRIOR TO 
AUGUST OF 2000 ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTES 
OF LIMITATION. 
Tolmans argue that their claims are not barred by estoppel or waiver. However, 
the issue presented by the City's motion is not an equitable one, but the legal question of 
whether the claims are time-barred by the running of the applicable limitations periods. 
Any claims Tolmans may have which are based upon the 1989 downzoning or the 1995 
adoption of a new General Plan are barred by Utah law. They failed to timely challenge 
those decisions within 30 days as required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(2) (1995).l 
Moreover, those claims are also barred by the four-year "catchall55 limitation in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25(3). The facts material to the statute of limitation question are 
undisputed. The City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Tolmans5 claims 
arising from any actions prior to August of 2000. 
II. TOLMANS HAVE FAILED TO CITE ANY APPLICABLE 
AUTHORITYY TO AVOID SUMMAKY JUDGMENT. 
Tolmans5 sole, conclusory argument with respect to the real issue before the Court 
is that cc[i]n this case not only is there a genuine issue as to whether the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal, it was so as a matter of law.55 (P5s memorandum p. 17.) 
1
 Though that statute did not exist in 1989, it was retroactive. Statutes are 
retroactively applied where they are procedural, dealing with the legal machinery which 
gives effect to substantive law. State ex. rel. T.M., 2003 UTApp 191, U 17, 73 P.3d 959, 
964. Statutes of limitation are procedural in nature and given presumptive retroactive 
effect. I.e., State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1021 (Conn. 2006); In re K.N.P., 179 S.W3d 
717, 720 (Tex.App. 2005). 
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They fail to address the governing Utah law cited by the City in its memorandum and 
provide no case law of their own to support such a conclusion. 
On the unrelated and immaterial issue of the 1989 downzoning, Tblmans do 
provide, without any legal analysis, an ALR annotation on spot zoning. There are three 
problems with this tactic. First, Utah courts have consistently refused to perform a party's 
analysis where the party has failed to do so. E.g., Midvale City Corp. v. Haltorru 2003 
UT 26,11 75, 73 P.3d 334, 349 (without analysis, court is unable to make an informed 
decision). Second, regardless of whether the 1989 downzoning might be considered as 
"spot zoning" in some other context,2 that decision is not subject to challenge here because 
the applicable statute of limitation has long since run. Third, the 2004 denial of Tolmans5 
rezoning request was not a spot zoning.3 
As discussed in the City's initial memorandum, under applicable Utah law, the 
City's denial of Tolmans' application was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Tolmans have 
provided no authority to support a different conclusion. 
It is also significant that Tolmans have failed to respond to the City's legal 
arguments with respect to their inverse condemnation and due process claims. In essence, 
the City's motion on those two issues is unchallenged, entitling it to judgment on those 
claims. 
2
 Typically a downzoning is not treated legally as a spot zoning. 
3
 The fundamental requirement to be a spot zoning is that a zoning change be 
effected. Here there was no change, just preservation of the status quo. 
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m . THE CITY'S DENIAL OF TOLMAN'S APPLICATION FOR REZONING 
WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
As discussed in the City's initial memorandum, the General Plan \^as being 
reviewed for possible revision which may have provided for a higher density use of the 
Tolman property. Rather than wait for that process to be completed or apply 
concurrendy for a General Plan amendment, Tolmans chose instead to proceed with their 
application for rezoning under the current General Plan and City ordinance which 
mandated compliance with the General Plan.4 The City subsequently denied the 
application because it did not conform to the General Plan. 
Well-established Utah law grants considerable discretion and a presumption of 
validity to legislative zoning decisions and imposes a high burden to show that those 
decisions are arbitrary capricious or illegal. The governing case here, one not discussed or 
challenged by Tolmans, is Bradley v. Payson City, 2003 UT 16, 70 P3d 47. In Bradley, 
the court held that the standard applicable to legislative zoning decisions is the "highly 
deferential" reasonably debatable standard for purposes of the arbitrary or capricious 
evaluation. Id. 11 14 at 52. Moreover, it held specifically that a City's denial of a rezoning 
based upon incompatibility with the City's General Plan satisfies the reasonably debatable 
standard. Id. 11 26 at 55. 
Because Logan City denied Tolmans3 rezoning application for failure to conform to 
the General Plan, its decision was, as a matter of law, not arbitrary or capricious. Tolmans 
4
 Tolmans state that they made application for the rezoning without the advice of 
counsel to avoid legal expenses. That does not excuse them from application of the zoning 
ordinances in effect at the time their application was made and considered. 
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have pointed to no breach of a statute or ordinance which would support a claim of 
illegality. The City is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Tolmans have failed to create an issue of fact which would preclude summary 
4 
judgment. The undisputed facts establish that all claims related to the 1989 and 1995 
actions by the City are time-barred. The facts material to the City's denial of Tolmans' 
more recent 2004 rezoning application establish that the City's decision was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. The City therefore respectfully requests that judgment be entered in 
its favor. 
DATED this piS day of April, 2006. 
KymberD. Housley 
Attorneys for Defendant Logan City 
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Case Number: 040101962 CR 
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW 
This matter is before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which was filed on June 22, 2005. No action was taken on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
until this Court noticed the matter up for dismissal due to failure to prosecute. The same was 
addressed on March 27, 2006, wherein counsel for the Plaintiff indicated to this Court that the 
response to the Motion for Summary Judgment would be timely filed. 
On April 14, 2006, a memorandum was filed by the Plaintiff opposing the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the same was supported by an affidavit of Thomas W. Tolman. A reply 
memorandum was filed by the Defendant on April 25, 2006, together with a Notice to Submit the 
same for decision. No request for oral arguments has been made by either party. 
For reasons stated by the Defendant in it's original Memorandum, and more specifically, 
- 1 -
in it's Reply Memorandum, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Counsel for the Defendant is instructed to prepare a formal order in conformance 
herewith. 
Dated this z day of fl\A\| 2006 
BY THE COURT. 
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JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
ROBERT C. KELLER (4861) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 250 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Phone: 801-521-5678 
Fax: 801-364-4500 
KYMBER D. HOUSLEY (6892) 
LOGAN CITY ATTORNEY 
255 N. Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
Phone: 435-716-9080 
Fax: 435-716-9081 
Attorneys for Defendant Logan City 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS W. TOLMAN and VERLA F. : 
TOLMAN, : SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
: Case No. 040101962 CR 
LOGAN CITY and JOHN and JANE DOES 1- : 
20, : Judge Gordon J. Low 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Gordon J. Low-
presiding, for consideration of defendant Logan City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Neither 
party requested oral argument, and the matter was submitted to the Court for decision on the 
basis of the papers submitted by counsel for the parties. Having reviewed the legal memorandum 
and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision dated May 2, 
2006, granting defendant Logan City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to that 
Memorandum Decision and for the reasons more fully set forth herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Logan City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted on the 
basis that there are no genuine issues of material fact for the reasons more fully set forth in the 
Memorandum Decision dated May 2, 2006, and the memoranda submitted in support of its 
motion on behalf of defendant Logan City. 
2. The plaintiffs Complaint, together with all claims and causes of action set forth 
therein, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits. All parties are to bear their own 
respective costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this 12- day of "SwYW 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
? 
